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Abstract
The idea of a multiverse – an ensemble of universes – has received
increasing attention in cosmology, both as the outcome of the originating
process that generated our own universe, and as an explanation for why
our universe appears to be fine-tuned for life and consciousness. Here we
carefully consider how multiverses should be defined, stressing the dis-
tinction between the collection of all possible universes, and ensembles of
really existing universes that are essential for an anthropic argument. We
show that such realised multiverses are by no means unique. A proper
measure on the space of all really existing universes or universe domains is
needed, so that probabilities can be calculated, and major problems arise
in terms of realised infinities. As an illustration we examine these issues in
the case of the set of Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) uni-
verses. Then we briefly summarise scenarios like chaotic inflation, which
suggest how ensembles of universe domains may be generated, and point
out that the regularities which must underlie any systematic description
of truly disjoint multiverses must imply some kind of common generating
mechanism. Finally, we discuss the issue of testability, which underlies the
question of whether multiverse proposals are really scientific propositions.
1 Introduction
The idea of a multiverse has been proposed as the only scientifically based way of
avoiding the fine-tuning required to set up the conditions for our seemingly very un-
likely universe to exist. Stephen Weinberg (2000), for example, uses it to explain
the value of the cosmological constant, which he relates to anthropic issues. Martin
Rees (2001) employs it to explain the whole set of anthropic coincidences (Barrow
and Tipler 1986), that is, to explain why our universe is a congenial home for life.
These and similar proposals have been triggered by the dawning awareness among
many researchers that there may be many other existing universes besides ours. This
possibility has received strong stimulation from proposals like Andrei Linde’s (1983,
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1990) chaotic inflationary scenario, in which the origin of our own observable universe
region naturally involves the origin of many other similar expanding universe regions.
There is however a vagueness about the proposed nature of multiverses. They
might occur in various ways, discussed by Weinberg (2000) and Tegmark (2003). They
might originate naturally in different times and places through meta-cosmic processes
like chaotic inflation, or in accord with Lee Smolin’s (1999) cosmic Darwinian vision.
In the latter case, an ensemble of expanding universe regions grow from each other
following gravitational collapse and re-expansion, where natural selection of universes
through optimisation of black hole production leads to bio-friendly universe regions.
This is an intriguing idea, but with many uncertain steps – in particular no proof has
been given of the last step, that the physics that maximises black hole production also
favours life. They might be associated with the multi-universe Everett-Wheeler-type
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Or perhaps multiverses can be truly disjoint
collections of universes (see Sciama 1993, Rees 2001, Tegmark 1998, 2003).
Some refer to the separate expanding universe regions in chaotic inflation as ‘uni-
verses’, even though they have a common causal origin and are all part of the same
single spacetime. In our view (as ‘uni’ means ‘one’) the Universe is by definition the
one unique connected 1 existing spacetime of which our observed expanding cosmo-
logical domain is a part. We will refer to situations such as in chaotic inflation as
a Multi-Domain Universe, as opposed to a completely causally disconnected Multi-
verse. Throughout this paper, when our discussion pertains equally well to disjoint
collections of universes (multiverses in the strict sense) and to the different domains
of a Multi-Domain Universe, we shall for simplicity simply use the word “ensemble”.
When an ensemble of universes are all sub-regions of a larger connected spacetime -
the “universe as a whole”- we have the multi-domain situation, which should be de-
scribed as such. Then we could reserve “multiverse” for the collection of genuinely
disconnected “universes” – those which are not locally causally related.
So far, none of these ideas have been developed to the point of actually describing
such ensembles of universes in detail, nor has it been demonstrated that a generic
well-defined ensemble will admit life. Some writers tend to imply that there is only
one possible multiverse (characterised by “all that can exist does exist”). This vague
prescription actually allows a vast variety of different realisations with differing prop-
erties, leading to major problems in the definition of the ensembles and in averaging,
due to the lack of a well-defined measure and the infinite character of the ensemble it-
self. Furthermore it is not at all clear that we shall ever be able to accurately delineate
the class of all possible universes.
The aim of this paper is to help clarify what is involved in a full description of
an ensemble of universes. Our first contribution is clarifying what is required in order
to describe the space of possible universes, where much hinges on what we regard
as ‘possible’. However that is only part of what is needed. It is crucial to recognise
that anthropic arguments for existence based on ensembles of universes with specific
properties require an actually existing ensemble with all the required properties. For
purposes of providing an explanation of existence, simply having a conceptually pos-
sible ensemble is not adequate - one needs a link to objects or things that actually
exist, or to mechanisms that make them exist.
1“Connected” implies “Locally causally connected”, that is all universe domains are con-
nected by C0 timelike lines which allow any number of reversals in their direction of time, as
in Feynman’s approach to electrodynamics. Thus it is a union of regions that are causally
connected to each other, and transcends particle and event horizons; for examples all points
in de Sitter space time are connected to each other by such lines.
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The second contribution of this paper is to show how an actually existing ensemble
may be described in terms of a space of possible universes, by defining a distribution
function (discrete or continuous) on the space of possible universes. This characterizes
which of the theoretically possible universes have been actualised in the ensemble - it
identifies those that have actually come into existence. This leads us to our third point:
the problems arising when it is claimed that there is an actually existing ensemble
containing an infinite number of universes or of expanding universe regimes. Actually
existing infinities are very problematic.
There are fundamental issues that arise in considering ensembles of actually ex-
isting universes: what would explain the existence of an ensemble, and its specific
properties? Why should there be this particular ensemble, rather than some other
one? Why should there be any regularity at all in its properties? The fourth point
we make is that if all the universes in an ensemble show regularities of structure, then
that implies some common generating mechanism. Some such structuring is necessary
if we are to be able to describe a multiverse with specified properties - a coherent de-
scription is only possible through the existence of such regularities. Hence a multiverse
consisting of completely causally disconnected universes is a problematic concept.
The issue of testability is a further important consideration: Is there any conceiv-
able direct or indirect way of testing for existence of an ensemble to which our universe
belongs? Our fifth point is that there is no way we can test any mechanism proposed
to impose such regularities: they will of necessity always remain speculative. The sixth
point is to argue that existence of multiverses or ensembles is in principle untestable by
any direct observations, and the same applies to any hypothesized properties we may
suppose for them. However certain observations would be able to disprove existence
of some multi-domain ensembles. It is only in that sense that the idea is a testable
proposition.
It is clear that in dealing with multiverses one inevitably runs up against philo-
sophical and metaphysical issues, for example concerning the ability to make scientific
conclusions in the absence of observational evidence, and in pursuing the issue of re-
alised infinities. A companion more philosophically oriented paper will pursue those
issues.
2 Describing Ensembles: Possibility
To characterise an ensemble of existing universes, we first need to develop adequate
methods for describing the class of all possible universes. This requires us to specify,
at least in principle, all the ways in which universes can be different from one another,
in terms of their physics, chemistry, biology, etc.
2.1 The Set of Possible Universes
The basis for describing ensembles or multiverses is contained in the structure and the
dynamics of a space M of all possible universes m, each of which can be described in
terms of a set of states s in a state space S . Each universe inM will be characterised by
a set P of distinguishing parameters p, which are coordinates on S . Some will be logical
parameters, some will be numerical constants, and some will be functions or tensor
fields defined in local coordinate neighbourhoods for s. Each universe m will evolve
from its initial state to some final state according to the dynamics operative, with some
or all of its parameters varying as it does so. The course of this evolution of states
4 GFR Ellis, U Kirchner and WR Stoeger
will be represented by a path in the state space S , depending on the parametrisation
of S . Thus, each such path (in degenerate cases a point) is a representation of one of
the universes m inM. The coordinates in S will be directly related to the parameters
specifying members of M. The parameter space P has dimension N which is the
dimension of the space of models M; the space of states S has N + 1 dimensions, the
extra dimension indicating the change of each model’s states with time, characterised
by an extra parameter, e.g., the Hubble parameter H which does not distinguish
between models but rather determines what is the state of dynamical evolution of
each model. Note that N may be infinite, and indeed will be so unless we consider
only geometrically highly restricted sets of universes.
It is possible that with some parameter choices the same physical universe m will
be multiply represented by this description; thus a significant issue is the equivalence
problem – identifying which different representations might in fact represent the same
universe model. In self-similar cases we get a single point in S described in terms of the
chosen parameters P : the state remains unchanged in terms of the chosen variables.
But we can always get such variables for any evolution, as they are just comoving
variables, not necessarily indicating anything interesting is happening dynamically.
The interesting issue is if this invariance is true in physically defined variables, e.g.,
expansion normalised variables, then physical self-similarity is occurring.
The very description of this space M of possibilities is based on an assumed set
of laws of behaviour, either laws of physics or meta-laws that determine the laws
of physics, which all universes m have in common; without this, we have no basis
for setting up its description. The detailed characterisation of this space, and its
relationship to S , will depend on the matter description used and its behaviour. The
overall characterisation of M therefore must incorporate a description both of the
geometry of the allowed universes and of the physics of matter. Thus the set of
parameters P will include both geometric and physical parameters.
The space M has a number of important subsets, for example:
1. MFLRW – the subset of all possible exactly Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-
Walker (FLRW) universes, described by the state space SFLRW (in the case of
dust plus non-interacting radiation a careful description of this phase space has
been given by Ehlers and Rindler1989).
2. Malmost−FLRW – the subset of all perturbed FLRWmodel universes. These need
to be characterised in a gauge-invariant way (see e.g. Ellis and Bruni 1989) so
that we can clearly identify those universes that are almost-FLRW and those
that are not.
3. Manthropic – the subset of all possible universes in which life emerges at some
stage in their evolution. This subset intersects Malmost−FLRW, and may even
be a subset of Malmost−FLRW, but does not intersect MFLRW (realistic models
of a life-bearing universe like ours cannot be exactly FLRW, for then there is no
structure).
4. MObservational – the subset of models compatible with current astronomical ob-
servations. Precisely because we need observers to make observations, this is a
subset of M anthropic.
If M truly represents all possibilities, one must have a description that is wide
enough to encompass all possibilities. It is here that major issues arise: how do we
decide what all the possibilities are? What are the limits of possibility? What classifi-
cations of possibility are to be included? “All that can happen happens ” must imply
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all possibilities, as characterised by our description in terms of families of parameters:
all allowed values must occur, and they must occur in all possible combinations. The
full space M must be large enough to represent all of these possibilities, along with
many others we cannot even conceive of, but which can nevertheless in principle also
be described by such parameters. An interesting related point has been pointed to us
by Jean-Phillipe Uzan: it may be that the larger the possibility space considered, the
more fine-tuned the actual universe appears to be - for with each extra possibility that
is included in the possibility space, unless it can be shown to relate to already existing
parameters, the actual universe and its close neighbours will live in a smaller fraction
of the possibility space. For example if we assume General Relativity then there is
only the parameter G to measure; but if we consider scalar-tensor theories, then we
have to explain why we are so close to General Relativity now. Hence there is a tension
between including all possibilities in what we consider, and giving an explanation for
fine tuning.
From these considerations we have the first key issue:
Issue 1: What determines M? Where does this structure come from? What is the
meta-cause that delimits this set of possibilities? Why is there a uniform structure
across all universes m in M?
The meta-question is whether any of these questions can be answered scientifically.
We return to that at the end.
2.2 Adequately Specifying Possible Anthropic Universes
When defining any ensemble of universes, possible or realised, we must specify all the
parameters which differentiate members of the ensemble from one another at any time
in their evolution. The values of these parameters may not be known or determinable
initially in many cases – some of them may only be set by transitions that occur via
processes like symmetry breaking within given members of the ensemble. In particular,
some of the parameters whose values are important for the origination and support of
life may only be fixed later in the evolution of universes in the multiverse.
We can separate our set of parameters P for the space of all possible universes
M into different categories, beginning with the most basic or fundamental, and pro-
gressing to more contingent and more complex categories. Ideally they should all be
independent of one another, but we will not be able to establish that independence
for each parameter, except for the most fundamental cosmological ones. In order to
categorise our parameters, we can doubly index each parameter p in P as pj(i) such
that those for j = 1 − 2 describe basic physics, for j = 3 − 5 describe the cosmology
(given that basic physics), and j = 6 − 7 pertain specifically to emergence and life
(we must include the latter if we seriously intend to address anthropic issues). Our
characterisation is as follows:
1. p1(i) are the basic physics parameters within each universe, excluding gravity -
parameters characterising the basic non-gravitational laws of physics in action,
related constants such as the fine-structure constant α, and including param-
eters describing basic particle properties (masses, charges, spins, etc.) These
should be logical parameters or dimensionless parameters, otherwise one may
be describing the same physics in other units.
2. p2(i) are basic parameters describing the nature of the cosmological dynamics,
e. g., p2(1) = 1 indicates Einstein gravity dominates, p2(1) = 2 indicates Brans-
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Dicke theory dominates, p2(1) = 3 indicates Electro-magnetism dominates, etc.
Associated with each choice are the relevant parameter values, e.g., p2(2) = G,
p2(3) = Λ, and in the Brans-Dicke case p2(4) = ω. If gravity can be derived
from more fundamental physics in some unified fundamental theory, these will
be related to p1(i); for example the cosmological constant may be determined
from quantum field theory and basic matter parameters.
3. p3(i) are cosmological parameters characterising the nature of the matter content
of a universe. These parameters encode whether radiation, baryons, dark matter,
neutrinos, scalar fields, etc. occur, in each case specifying the relevant equations
of state and auxiliary functions needed to determine the physical behaviour of
matter (e.g. barotropic equations of state and the potential function for scalar
fields). These are characterisations of physical possibilities for the macro-states
of matter arising out of fundamental physics, so the possibilities here will be
related to the parameters in p1(i). Realistic representations will include all the
above, but simplified ensembles considered for exploratory purposes may exclude
some or many of them.
4. p4(i) are physical parameters determining the relative amounts of each kind
of matter present in the specific cosmological solutions envisaged, for example
the density parameters Ωiof various components at some specific stage of its
evolution (which then for example determine the matter to anti-matter ratio
and the entropy to baryon ratio). The matter components present will be those
characterised by p3(i).
5. p5(i) are geometrical parameters characterising the spacetime geometry of the
cosmological solutions envisaged- for example the scale factor a(t), Hubble pa-
rameter H(t), and spatial curvature parameter k in FLRW models. These will
be related to p4(i) by the gravitational equations set in p2(i), for example the
Einstein Field Equations.
6. p6(i) are parameters related to the functional emergence of complexity in the
hierarchy of structure, for example allowing the existence of chemically complex
molecules. Thus p6(1) might be the number of different types of atoms allowed
(as characterised in the periodic table), p6(2) the number of different states of
matter possible (solid, liquid, gas, plasma for example), and p6(3) the number of
different types of molecular bonding. These are emergent properties arising out
of the fundamental physics in operation, and so are related to the parameters
set in p1(i).
7. p7(i) are biologically relevant parameters related specifically to the functional
emergence of life and of self-consciousness, for example p7(1) might characterise
the possibility of supra-molecular chemistry and p7(2) that of living cells. This
builds on the complexity allowed by p6(i) and relates again to the parameter set
p1(i)
It is important to note that these parameters will describe the set of possibilities
we are able to characterise on the basis of our accumulated scientific experience.
The limits of our understanding are relevant here, in the relation between what
we conceive of as this space of possibilities, and what it really is. There may be
universes which we believe are possible on the basis of what we know of physics,
that may in fact not be possible. There may also be universes which we conceive
of as being impossible for one reason or another, that turn out to be possible.
And it is very likely that we simply may not be able to imagine or envisage all
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the possibilities. However this is by no means a statement that “all that can
occur” is arbitrary. On the contrary, specifying the set of possible parameters
determines a uniform high-level structure that is obeyed by all universes in M.
We see, then, that a possibility space M is the set of universes (one-parameter
sets of states S) obeying the dynamics characterised by a parameter space P ,
which may be considered to be the union of all allowed parameters pj(i) for all
i, j as briefly discussed above:
M = {S ,P}, P = ∪i,j pj(i).
Because the parameters P determine the dynamics, the set of paths in S char-
acterising individual universes m are determined by this prescription. In some
particular envisaged ensemble, some of these parameters (‘class parameters’)
may be fixed across the ensemble, thus defining a class of universes considered,
while others (‘member parameters’) will vary across the ensemble, defining the
individual members of that class. Thus
P = Pclass∪ Pmember .
As we consider more generic ensembles, class parameters will be allowed to vary
and so will become member parameters. In an ensemble in which all that is
possible happens, all parameters will be member parameters; however that is so
hard to handle that we usually analyse sub-spaces characterised by particular
class parameters.
2.3 Describing the Geometry of Possible Universes
Cosmological models are characterised by a preferred timelike vector field u : uaua =
−1, usually the fluid flow vector (Ellis 1971a), but sometimes chosen for other reasons,
e.g. to fit local symmetries. To describe a cosmological spacetime locally we must give
a description of its (generally inhomogeneous and anisotropic) geometry via suitable
parameters p5(i). This description may be usefully given in terms of a tetrad basis as
follows (see Ellis and van Elst 1999, Wainwright and Ellis 1996, Uggla, et al. 2003):
Feature 1 : a set of local coordinates X = {xi} must be chosen in each chart of a
global atlas. This will in particular have a time coordinate t which will be used to
characterise evolution of the universe; this should be chosen in as uniform as possible
a way across all the universes considered, for example it may be based on surfaces of
constant Hubble parameter H for the preferred vector field u.
Feature 2 : in each chart, to determine the geometry we must be given the compo-
nents E = [eia(xj)] of an orthonormal tetrad with the fluid flow vector chosen as the
timelike tetrad vector (a, b, c.. are tetrad indices; four of these components can be set
to zero by suitable choice of coordinates). Together the coordinates and the tetrad
form the reference frame
Pframe ≡ {X , E}. (1)
The metric tensor is then
ds2 = gij (x
k)dxidxj = ηab e
a
i(x
k) ebj(x
l)dxidxj
where ηab is the Minkowski metric:
ηab = ea.eb = diag(−1,+1,+1,+1)
8 GFR Ellis, U Kirchner and WR Stoeger
(because the tetrad is orthonormal) and ebj(x
l) are the inverse of eia(x
j) :
eia(x
j)e bi (x
j) = δba.
Thus the metric is given by
ds2 = −
(
e0idx
i
)2
+
(
e1idx
i
)2
+
(
e2idx
i
)2
+
(
e3idx
i
)2
(2)
The basic geometric quantities used to determine the spacetime geometry are the
rotation coefficients Γabc of this tetrad, defined by
Γabc = e
a
j e
j
c;ke
k
b.
They may conveniently be given in terms of geometric quantities
Pgeometry ≡ {u˙α, θ, σαβ , ωαβ,Ωγ , aα, nαβ}. (3)
characterised as follows:
Γα00 = u˙α,
Γα0β =
1
3
θ + σαβ − ωαβ,
Γαβ0 = ǫαβγΩ
γ ,
Γαβγ = a[αδβ]γ + ǫγδ[αn
δ
β] +
1
2
ǫαβδn
γ
δ,
where u˙α is the acceleration of the fluid flow congruence, θ is its expansion, σαβ =
σ(αβ) is its shear (σ
b
b = 0), and ωαβ = ω[αβ] its vorticity, while nαβ = n(αβ) and aα
determine the spatial rotation coefficients (see Wainwright and Ellis 1996, Ellis and
van Elst 1999). Greek indices (with range 1 − 3) indicate that all these quantities
are orthogonal to ua. They are spacetime fields, although in particular high-symmetry
cases they may be independent of many or of all the coordinates. The Jacobi identities,
Bianchi identities, and Einstein field equations can all be written out in terms of these
quantities, as can the components Eαβ, Hαβ of the Weyl tensor (see Ellis and van
Elst 1999). Except in the special cases of isotropic spacetimes and locally rotationally
symmetric spacetimes (see Ellis 1967, van Elst and Ellis 1996), the basis tetrad can
be chosen in an invariant way so that three of these quantities vanish and all the rest
are scalar invariants.
Thus the geometry is determined by the 36 spacetime functions in the combined
set (E ,Pgeometry) with some chosen specification of coordinates X , with the metric
then determined by (2). For detailed dynamical studies it is often useful to rescale the
variables in terms of the expansion (see Wainwright and Ellis 1995, Uggla et al 2003
for details). Note that the same universe may occur several times over in this space;
the equivalence problem is determining when such multiple representations occur. We
do not recommend going to a quotient space where each universe occurs only once,
as for example in the dynamical studies of Fischer and Marsden (1979), for the cost
of doing so is to destroy the manifold structure of the space of spacetimes. It is
far better to allow multiple representations of the same universe (for example several
representations of the same Bianchi I universe occur in the Kasner ring in the space of
Bianchi models, see Wainwright and Ellis 1996) both to keep the manifold structure
intact and because then the dynamical structure becomes clearer.
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Feature 3 : To determine the global structure, we need a set of composition functions
relating different charts in the atlas where they overlap, thus determining the global
topology of the universe.
Together these are the parameters p5(i) needed to distinguish model states. A
particular model will be represented as a path through those states. The nature of
that evolution will be determined by the matter present.
2.4 Describing the Physics of Possible Universes
Feature 4 : To determine the matter stress-energy tensor we must specify the quantities
Pmatter ≡ {µ, qα, p, πab,ΦA} (4)
for all matter components present, where µ is the energy density, qα is the momentum
flux density, p is the pressure, πab = π(ab) the anisotropic pressure (π
b
b = 0), and
ΦA (A = 1..Amax) is some set of internal variables sufficient to make the matter
dynamics deterministic when suitable equations of state are added (for example these
might include the temperature, the entropy, the velocity vi of matter relative to the
reference frame, some scalar fields and their time derivatives, or a particle distribution
function). These are parameters p4(i) for each kind of matter characterised by p3(i).
Some of these dynamical quantities may vanish (for example, in the case of a ‘perfect
fluid’, qα = 0, πab = 0) and some of those that do not vanish will be related to others
by the equations of state (for example, in the case of a barotropic fluid, p = p(µ)) and
dynamic equations (for example the Klein Gordon equation for a scalar field). These
equations of state can be used to reduce the number of variables in Pmatter; when they
are not used in this way, they must be explicitly stated in a separate parameter space
Peos in p3(i). In broad terms
Peos ≡ {qα = qα(µ,ΦA), p = p(µ,ΦA),
πab = πab(µ,ΦA), Φ˙A = Φ˙A(ΦA)}. (5)
Given this information the equations become determinate and we can obtain the
dynamical evolution of the models in the state space; see for example Wainwright
and Ellis (1996), Hewitt et al (2002), Horwood et al (2002) for the case of Bianchi
models (characterised by all the variables defined above depending on the time only)
and Uggla et al (2003), Lim et al (2003) for the generic case.
Feature 5 : However more general features may vary: the gravitational constant,
the cosmological constant, and so on; and even the dimensions of spacetime or the
kinds of forces in operation. These are the parameters Pphysics comprising p1(i) and
p2(i). What complicates this issue is that some or many of these features may be
emergent properties, resulting for example from broken symmetries occurring as the
universe evolves. Thus they may come into being rather than being given as initial
conditions that then hold for all time.
Initially one might think that considering all possible physics simply involves
choices of coupling constants and perhaps letting some fundamental constant vary.
But the issue is more fundamental than that. Taking seriously the concept of includ-
ing all possibilities in the ensembles, the space of physical parameters Pphysics used
to describe M, the parameters p2(i) might for example include a parameter pgrav(i)
such that: for i = 1 there is no gravity; for i = 2 there is Newtonian gravity; for i = 3
general relativity is the correct theory at all energies – there is no quantum gravity
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regime; for i = 4 loop quantum gravity is the correct quantum gravity theory; for
i = 5 a particular version of superstring theory or M-theory is the correct theory.
Choices such as these will arise for all the laws and parameters of physics. In
some universes there will be a fundamental unification of physics expressible in a basic
“theory of everything”, in others this will not be so. Some universes will be realised
as branes in a higher dimensional spacetime, others will not.
2.5 The Anthropic subset
We are interested in the subset of universes that allow intelligent life to exist. That
means we need a function on the set of possible universes that describes the probability
that life may evolve. An adaptation of the Drake equation (Drake and Shostak) gives
for the probability of intelligent life in any particular universe m in an ensemble,
Plife(m) = F ∗Π (6)
where the existence of a habitat for life is expressed by the product
Π = Pgal ∗R ∗ fS ∗ fp ∗ ne (7)
and the coming into existence of life, given such a habitat, is expressed by the product
F = fl ∗ fi. (8)
Here Pgal is the probability of galaxies forming in the universe considered, R is the
average rate of star formation in galaxies, fS is the fraction of these stars that can
provide a suitable environment for life (they are ‘Sun-like’), fp is the fraction of stars
that are surrounded by planetary systems, ne is the mean number of planets in each
such system that are suitable habitats for life (they are ‘Earth-like’), fl is the fraction
of such planets on which life actually originates, and fi represents the fraction of those
planets on which there is life where self-conscious beings develop. The anthropic subset
of a possibility space is that set of universes for which Plife(m) > 0.
The probabilities {Pgal, R, fS , fp, ne, fl, fi) are functions of the physical and cosmo-
logical parameters characterised above, so there will be many different representations
of this parameter set depending on the degree to which we try to represent such inter-
relations. The astrophysical issues expressed in the product Π are the easier ones to
investigate. We can in principle make a cut between those consistent with the eventual
emergence of life and those incompatible with it by considering each of the factors in
Π in turn, taking into account their dependence on the parameters p1(i) to p5(i), and
only considering the next factor if all the previous ones are non-zero (an approach that
fits in naturally with Bayesian statistics and the successive allocation of relevant pri-
ors). In this way we can assign “bio-friendly intervals” to the possibility space M. If
Π is non-zero we can move on to considering similarly whether F is non-zero, based on
the parameters p6(i) to p7(i) determining if true complexity is possible, which in turn
depend on the physics parameters p1(i) in a crucial way that is not fully understood.
It will be impossible at any stage to characterise that set of the multiverse in which all
the conditions necessary for the emergence of self-conscious life and its maintenance
have been met, for we do not know what those conditions are (for example, we do
not know if there are forms of life possible that are not based on carbon and organic
chemistry). Nevertheless it is clear that life demands unique combinations of many
different parameter values that must be realised simultaneously. When we look at
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these combinations, they will span a very small subset of the whole parameter space
(Davies 2003, Tegmark 2003).
If we wish to deal with specifically human life, we need to make the spaceM large
enough to deal with all relevant parameters for this case, where free will arises. This
raises substantial extra complications, discussed in the companion (more philosophical)
paper.
2.6 Parameter space revisited
It is now clear that some of the parameters discussed above are dependent on other
ones, so that while we can write down a more or less complete set at varying levels
of detail they will in general not be an independent set. There is a considerable
challenge here: to find an independent set. Inter alia this involves solving both the
initial value problem for general relativity and the way that galactic and planetary
formation depend on fundamental physics constants (which for example determine
radiation transfer properties in stars and in proto-planetary gas clouds), as well as
relations there may be between the fundamental constants and the way the emergent
complexity of life depends on them. We are a long way from understanding all these
issues. This means we can provide necessary sets of parameter values but cannot
guarantee completeness or independence.
3 The Set of Realised Universes
We have now characterised the set of possible universes. But in any given ensemble,
they may not all be realised, and some may be realised many times. The purpose
of this section is to set up a formalism making clear which of the possible universes
(characterised above) occur in a specific realised ensemble.
3.1 A distribution function describing an ensemble of re-
alised universes
In order to select from M a set of realised universes we need to define on M a
distribution function f(m) specifying how many times each type of possible universe
m inM is realised. The function f(m) expresses the contingency in any actualisation
– the fact that not every possible universe has to be realised, and that any actual
universe does not have to be realised as a matter of necessity. Things could have been
different! Thus, f(m) describes the ensemble of universes or multiverse envisaged as
being realised out of the set of possibilities. If these realisations were determined by the
laws of necessity alone, they would simply be the set of possibilities described by M.
In general they include only a subset of possible universes, and multiple realisations
of some of them. This is the way in which chance or contingency is realised in the
ensemble2.
2It has been suggested to us that in mathematics terms it does not make sense to distinguish
identical copies of the same object: they should be identified with each other because they
are essentially the same. But we are here dealing with physics rather than mathematics, and
with real existence rather than possible existence, and then multiple copies must be allowed
(for example all electrons are identical to each other; physics would be very different if there
were only one electron in existence).
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The class of models considered is determined by all the parameters held constant
(‘class parameters’). Considering the varying parameters for the class (‘member pa-
rameters’), some will take only discrete values, but for each one allowed to take con-
tinuous values we need a volume element of the possibility space M characterised by
parameter increments dpj(i) in all such varying parameters pj(i). The volume element
will be given by a product
π = Πi,j mij(m) dpj(i) (9)
where the product Πi,j runs over all continuously varying member parameters i, j in
the possibility space, and the mij weight the contributions of the different parameter
increments relative to each other. These weights depend on the parameters pj(i)
characterising the universe m. The number of galaxies corresponding to the set of
parameter increments dpj(i) will be dN given by
dN = f(m)π (10)
for continuous parameters; for discrete parameters, we add in the contribution from
all allowed parameter values. The total number of galaxies in the ensemble will be
given by
N =
∫
f(m)π (11)
(which will often diverge), where the integral ranges over all allowed values of the
member parameters and we take it to include all relevant discrete summations. The
probable value of any specific quality p(m) defined on the set of galaxies will be given
by
P =
∫
p(m)f(m)π (12)
Such integrals over the space of possibilities give numbers, averages, and probabilities.
Hence, a (realised) ensemble E of galaxies is described by a possibility space M,
a measure π on M, and a distribution function f(m) on M :
E = {M, π, f(m)}. (13)
The distribution function f(m) might be discrete (e. g., there are 3 copies of
universem1 and 4 copies of universem2, with no copies of any other possible universe),
or continuous (e.g. characterised by a given distribution of densitiesΩi). In many
cases a distribution function will exclude many possible universes from the realisation
it specifies.
Now it is conceivable that all possibilities are realised – that all universes in M
exist at least once. This would mean that the distribution function
f(m) 6= 0 for all m ∈ M.
But there are an infinite number of distribution functions which would fulfil this condi-
tion, and so a really existing ‘ensemble of all possible universes’ is not unique. In such
ensembles, all possible values of each distinguishing parameter would be predicted to
exist in different members of the multiverse in all possible combinations with all other
parameters at least once, but they may occur many times. One of the problems is
that this often means that the integrals associated with such distribution functions
would diverge, preventing the calculation of probabilities from such models (see our
treatment of the FLRW case below).
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From this consideration we have the second key issue:
Issue 2: What determines f(m)? What is the meta-cause that delimits the set of
realisations out of the set of possibilities?
The answer to this question has to be different from the answer to Issue 1, precisely
because here we are describing the contingency of selection of a subset of possibilities
from the set of all possibilities, determination of the latter being what is considered in
Issue 1. Again, the meta-question is whether this can be answered scientifically.
3.2 Measures and Probabilities
It is clear that f(m) will enable us to derive numbers and probabilities relative to
the realisation it defines only if we also have determined a unique measure π on the
ensemble, characterised by a specific choice of the weights mij(m) in (9), where these
weights will depend on the pj(i). There are three issues here.
First, what may seem a “natural” measure for M in one set of coordinates will
not be natural in another set of coordinates. Hence the concept of a measure is not
unique, as is illustrated below in the FLRW case. This is aggravated by the fact that
the parameter space will often contain completely different kinds of quantities (density
parameters and the values of the gravitational constant and the cosmological constant,
for example), and assigning the weights entails somehow assigning a relative weighting
between these quite different kinds of quantities.
Second, it is possible that we might be able to assign probabilities χ(m) to points of
M from some kind of physical argument, and then predict f(m) from these, following
the usual line of argument for determining entropy in a gas. However, we then have
to determine some reason why χ(m) is what it is and how it then leads to f(m). In
the entropy case, we assume equal probability in each phase space volume; why should
that hold for an ensemble of universes? Realising such probabilities seems to imply a
causal mechanism relating the created members of the multiverse to one another so
they are not in fact causally disjoint, otherwise, there is no reason why any probability
law (Gaussian normal, for example) should be obeyed. We will return to this point
later.
Finally, the relevant integrals may diverge. In that case, assigning mean values
or averages for physical quantities in an ensemble of universes is problematic (see
Kirchner and Ellis 2003 and references therein).
3.3 The Anthropic subset
The expression (6) can be used in conjunction with the distribution function f(m) of
galaxies to determine the probability of life arising in the whole ensemble:
Plife(E) =
∫
f(m) ∗ Pgal ∗R ∗ fS ∗ fp ∗ ne ∗ fl ∗ fi ∗ π (14)
(which is a particular case of (12) based on (6)). An anthropic ensemble is one for
which Plife(E) > 0. If the distribution function derives from a probability function, we
may combine the probability functions to get an overall anthropic probability function-
for an example see Weinberg et al discussed below, where it is assumed that Pgal is the
only relevant parameter for the existence of life. This is equivalent to assuming that
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R∗fS∗fp∗ne∗fl∗fi = 1. This assumption might be acceptable in our physically realised
universe, but there is no reason to believe it would hold generally in an ensemble
because these parameters will depend on other ensemble parameters, which will vary.
3.4 Problems With Infinity
When speaking of multiverses or ensembles of universes – possible or realised – the issue
of infinity often crops up. Researchers often envision an infinite set of universes, in
which all possibilities are realised. Can there really be an infinite set of really existing
universes? We suggest that, on the basis of well-known philosophical arguments, the
answer is No.
There is no conceptual problem with an infinite set – countable or uncountable – of
possible or conceivable universes. However, as stressed by David Hilbert (1964), it can
be argued that a really existing infinite set is not possible. As he points out, following
many others, the existence of the actually infinite inevitably leads to well-recognised
unresolvable contradictions in set theory, and thus in definitions and deductive foun-
dations of mathematics itself (Hilbert, pp. 141-142). His basic position therefore is
that “Just as operations with the infinitely small were replaced by operations with
the finite which yielded exactly the same results . . ., so in general must deductive
methods based on the infinite be replaced by finite procedures which yield exactly
the same results.” (p. 135) He concludes, “Our principle result is that the infinite is
nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate
basis for rational thought . . . The role that remains for the infinite to play is solely
that of an idea . . . which transcends all experience and which completes the con-
crete as a totality . . .” (Hilbert, p. 151). Others (see Spitzer 2000 and Stoeger
2003 and references therein) have further pointed out that realised infinite sets are not
constructible – there is no procedure one can in principal implement to complete such
a set – they are simply incompletable. But, if that is the case, then “infinity” cannot
be arrived at, or realised. On the contrary, the concept itself implies its inability to
be realised! This is precisely why a realised past infinity in time is not considered
possible from this standpoint – since it involves an infinite set of completed events or
moments. There is no way of constructing such a realised set, or actualising it.
Thus, it is important to recognise that infinity is not an actual number we can ever
specify or reach – it is simply the code-word for “it continues without end”. Whenever
infinities emerge in physics – such as in the case of singularities – we can be reasonably
sure, as is usually recognised, that there has been a breakdown in our models. An
achieved infinity in any physical parameter (temperature, density, spatial curvature)
is almost certainly not a possible outcome of any physical process – simply because
it means traversing in actuality an interval of values which never ends. We assume
space extends forever in Euclidean geometry and in many cosmological models, but
we can never prove that any realised 3-space in the real universe continues in this way
- it is an untestable concept, and the real spatial geometry of the universe is almost
certainly not Euclidean. Thus Euclidean space is an abstraction that is probably not
realised in physical practice. In the physical universe spatial infinities can be avoided
by compact spatial sections, either resultant from positive spatial curvature or from
choice of compact topologies in universes that have zero or negative spatial curvature,
(for example FLRW flat and open universes can have finite rather than infinite spatial
sections). Future infinite time is never realised: rather the situation is that whatever
time we reach, there is always more time available. Much the same applies to claims of
a past infinity of time: there may be unbounded time available in the past in principle,
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but in what sense can it be attained in practice? The arguments against an infinite
past time are strong – it’s simply not constructible in terms of events or instants of
time, besides being conceptually indefinite.3
The same problem of a realised infinity may be true in terms of the supposed
ensembles of universes. It is difficult enough conceiving of an ensemble of many ‘really
existing’ universes that are totally causally disjoint from our own, and how that could
come into being, particularly given two important features. Firstly, specifying the
geometry of a generic universe requires an infinite amount of information because
the quantities in P geometry are fields on spacetime, in general requiring specification
at each point (or equivalently, an infinite number of Fourier coefficients) - they will
almost always not be algorithmically compressible. This greatly aggravates all the
problems regarding infinity and the ensemble. Only in highly symmetric cases, like
the FLRW solutions, does this data reduce to a finite number of parameters. One
can suggest that a statistical description would suffice, where a finite set of numbers
describe the statistics of the solution, rather than giving a full description. Whether
this suffices to adequately describe an ensemble where ‘all that can happen, happens’
is a moot point. We suggest not, for the simple reason that there is no guarantee that
all possible models will obey any known statistical description. That assumption is a
major restriction on what is assumed to be possible.
Secondly, many universes in the ensemble may themselves have infinite spatial
extent and contain an infinite amount of matter, with the paradoxical conclusions that
entails (Ellis and Brundrit 1979). To conceive of physical creation of an infinite set of
universes (most requiring an infinite amount of information for their prescription, and
many of which will themselves be spatially infinite) is at least an order of magnitude
more difficult than specifying an existent infinitude of finitely specifiable objects.
The phrase ‘everything that can exist, exists’ implies such an infinitude, but glosses
over all the profound difficulties implied. One should note here particularly that
problems arise in this context in terms of the continuum assigned by classical theories
to physical quantities and indeed to spacetime itself. Suppose for example that we
identify corresponding times in the models in an ensemble and then assume that all
values of the density parameter occur at each spatial point at that time. Because of
the real number continuum, this is an uncountably infinite set of models – and genuine
existence of such an uncountable infinitude is highly problematic. But on the other
hand, if the set of realised models is either finite or countably infinite, then almost all
possible models are not realised – the ensemble represents a set of measure zero in the
set of possible universes. Either way the situation is distinctly uncomfortable. However
we might try to argue around this by a discretization argument: maybe differences
in some parameter of less than say 10−10 are unobservable, so we can replace the
continuum version by a discretised one, and perhaps some such discretisation is forced
on us by quantum theory. If this is the intention, then that should be made explicit.
That solves the ‘ultraviolet divergence’ associated with the small-scale continuum, but
not the ‘infrared divergence’ associated with supposed infinite distances, infinite times,
and infinite values of parameters describing cosmologies.
3One way out would be, as quite a bit of work in quantum cosmology seems to indicate, to
have time originating or emerging from the quantum-gravity dominated primordial substrate
only “later.” In other words, there would have been a “time” or an epoch before time as
such emerged. Past time would then be finite, as seems to be demanded by philosophical
arguments, and yet the timeless primordial state could have lasted “forever,” whatever that
would mean. This possibility avoids the problem of constructibility.
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4 Ensembles of FLRW Universes
Having established the broad set of issues concerning multiverses that we believe need
to be addressed, we shall for the remainder of this paper limit ourselves to the FLRW
sectorMFLRW of the ensemble of all possible universesM in order to illustrate these is-
sues4. We assume the family considered is filled with matter components characterised
by a γ-law equation of state, and mainly restrict our attention to their cosmological
parameters, although full consideration of anthropic issues would be characterised by
including all the other parameters. Our descriptive treatment will consider FLRW uni-
verse domains (whether a true multiverse or separate domains in a single spacetime)
as distinct but with common physical characteristics.
4.1 Properties of FLRW models
FLRW models are homogeneous and isotropic models described by the metric
ds2 = −dt2 + a2(t)
(
r2
1− kr2 + r
2dΩ2
)
, (15)
where dΩ2 = dϑ2 + sin2(ϑ) dϕ2 denotes the line element on the two-dimensional
unit sphere, a(t) is the scale-factor, and
k =


1 for closed models
0 for flat models
−1 for open models
is the normalised curvature. The FLRW model is completely determined by k and
the scale-factor a(t), which incorporates the time-evolution and is obtained from the
Einstein-Field equations together with the matter description.5
Assuming gravity is described by the Einstein field equations, the evolution of
FLRW models is described by the Friedmann equation
H2(Ω− 1) = k
a2
, (16)
where H ≡ a˙/a (a dot denotes differentiation with respect to proper time) is the
Hubble parameter and Ω the density parameter. We restrict our discussion to models
with only a cosmological constant Λ and one matter component which obeys a γ-law
equation of state, i.e., its pressure p and density ρ are related by p = (γ − 1)ρ, where
γ is constant. This specification of parameters p3(i) includes in particular the case of
dust (γ = 1) and radiation (γ = 4/3). The total density parameter is
Ω = Ωm + ΩΛ. (17)
where the matter density parameter is Ωm ≡ κρ3H2 and the vacuum-energy density
parameter is ΩΛ ≡ Λ3H2 (representing a cosmological constant). These form the pa-
rameters p4(i).
4Many discussions implicitly suggest that this is the whole possibility space, as they only
consider FLRW models as possibilities. However these clearly form a very small subspace of
all geometrical possibilities.
5The way the tetrad description given above relates to FLRW universes is described in
detail in Ellis and MacCallum (1968); the standard coordinates given here are more convenient
if one discusses only the FLRW models.
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The second time derivative of the scale factor is determined by the Raychaudhuri
equation
2q = (3γ − 2)Ωm − ΩΛ, (18)
where q ≡ − a¨
aH2
is the dimensionless deceleration parameter. The matter evolution
is given by the energy-conservation equation
ρ˙ = −3γρH (19)
or equivalently by
Ω˙m = ΩmH(q + 1− 3γ). (20)
Besides the normalised curvature k there are two constants of motion, χ ≡ κρa3γ/3
and the cosmological constant Λ. Given these parameters, the dynamical evolution is
determined from the implied initial conditions: {a(t0),Ωi0, γi, k} ⇒ a(t).
4.2 Parametrising FLRW models
In order to define a FLRW ensemble we need a set of independent parameters which
uniquely identify all possible models. We want to consider all possible FLRW mod-
els with the same physical laws as in our universe, but possibly different coupling
constants. There is then one set of parameters p2(i) which defines the gravitational
“physics” of the model in terms of the coupling constants – for simplicity let us only
consider the gravitational constant G here – and further sets p5(i), p4(i) which identify
the geometry and matter content of the actual model, and which are related to each
other via the Einstein field equations.
Among the various options there are two particularly useful parametrisations.
Ehlers and Rindler (1989) developed a parametrisation in terms of the observable
density parameters (they also include a radiation component) and the Hubble param-
eter. With Ωk ≡ kH2a2 the Friedmann equation becomes
Ωm +ΩΛ − 1 = Ωk. (21)
The curvature parameter Ωk determines k = sgn(Ωk).For k 6= 0 the scale-factor, and
hence the metric (15), is determined by
a2(t) =
k
H2Ωk
=
k
H2(Ωm + ΩΛ − 1) ,
while for k = 0 its value is unimportant because of scale-invariance in that case. Hence
any state is completely described by Ωm,ΩΛ, and H .
In order to parametrise the models rather than the states, we need to select one
particular time t0 for each model at which we take the above parameters as represen-
tative parameters Ωm0,ΩΛ0, and H0 for this model.
6 We note that this time t0 can
be model dependent because not all models will reach the age t0.
All big-bang FLRW models start with an infinite positive Hubble parameter whose
absolute value reaches or approaches asymptotically a minimum value Hmin. Hence
we could define the time t0 as the time when the model first takes a certain value
H0(pI) > Hmin(pI) , where pI represents the model parameters. One particular choice
of H0(pI) is given by
H0(pI) ≡ exp(Hmin(pI))
6Hence, in general different models correspond to the same values of Ωm and ΩΛ, depending
on the value of H.
18 GFR Ellis, U Kirchner and WR Stoeger
On the other hand, by setting H0(pI) = const and excluding all models which never
reach this value one finds easily a parametrisation of all models which reach this Hubble
value during their evolution.
While above choice of parameters give a convenient parametrisation in terms of
observables which covers closed, flat, and open models, it is disturbing that for each
model an arbitrary time has to be chosen. This also leads to a technical difficulty,
because the parameters {H0,Ωm0,ΩΛ0} are subject to the constraint H0 = H0(pI).
For these reasons it is often convenient to use a set of parameters which are comov-
ing in the state-space, i.e., parameters which are constants of motion. As mentioned
above, for open and closed models such a set is given by the matter constant χ, the
cosmological constant Λ, and the normalised curvature constant k. For flat models
one can rescale the scale factor, which allows us to set χ = 1.
These parameters are related to the observational quantities by (for k = ±1 )
χ =
ΩmH
2
(H2|1− Ωm − ΩΛ|)3γ/2 and Λ = 3H
2ΩΛ.
The evolution of these models through state space is illustrated here in terms of
two different parametrisations of the state space, see Figures 1a and 1b. For a detailed
investigation of these evolutions for models with non-interacting matter and radiation,
see Ehlers and Rindler (1989).
4.3 The possibility space
The structures defined so far are the uniform structures across the class of models
in this possibility space, characterised both by laws of physics (in particular General
Relativity) and by a restricted class of geometries. It is clear that universes in a multi-
verse should be able to differ in at least some properties from each other. We have just
characterised the geometrical possibilities we are considering. The next question is,
which physical laws and parameters can vary within the ensemble, and which values
can they take? For this simplified discussion let us just assume that only the gravi-
tational constant G and the cosmological constant Λ (which also qualifies as a model
parameter) are variables, with the ranges7 G ∈ [0,∞) and Λ ∈ (−∞,∞). However, if
we consider “all that is possible ” within this restricted class of FLRW models, maybe
we should consider G ∈ (−∞,∞). There is still considerable uncertainty as to the
nature of an ensemble even within this restricted context. Whatever is chosen here
defines the set of possibilities that can arise.
4.4 The measure
For a complete probabilistic description of an ensemble we need not only a distribution
function P , but also a measure π for the parameter space (see Section 3.1). The
information entropy
S ≡ −
∫
dxP (x) log
(
P (x)
µ(x)
)
(22)
is then maximised for the probability distribution equal to this measure, representing
the state of minimal knowledge.
7It is worth noting that when G = 0, we do obtain FLRW solutions to the Einstein-Field
equations: the Milne universe which is effectively empty – no gravity effective.
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(b) ΩΛ −Ωm- plane
Figure 1: Phase-space diagrams showing the evolution of FLRW-models (as
given by the Friedmann equation) in the Ωm − H and ΩΛ − Ωm -plane for
Λ = 1. Models can evolve in both directions along the lines. Models which start
with a big-bang originate on the right in figure (a) (corresponding to H =∞).
Models which reach H = 0 (in a finite time) reverse their direction of evolution,
i.e., they follow the same line back-wards. These are the re-collapsing models.
The limiting case to the forever-expanding models is given by the model which
approaches asymptotically the Einstein-static universe.
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Without knowledge of the creation mechanism it is impossible to determine this
measure with certainty. Nevertheless, we might ask what our best guess for such
a measure should be in a state of minimal information, where only a certain set of
independent parameters, describing the ensemble, and their ranges are known.
The only known method for constructing such a measure is Jaynes’ principle. Its
application to FLRW models with γ-law equation of state has been discussed in Kirch-
ner and Ellis (2003). One identifies a set of transformations x′(x) in possibility space
which leaves the mathematical structure invariant, and demands that the measure is
invariant under these transformations. The two most important cases are given by
parameters which can take all real values, and those that take on all positive real
values.
In the first case, if z is a valid parameter value, so is z′ = z + α for all real α.
According to Jaynes’ principle the measure should obey π =µ(z)dz = µ(z′)dz′ and
hence µ(z) = µ(z′), i.e., the measure is constant.
If on the other hand a parameter u only takes non-zero positive values, we can
generate another valid parameter value by u′ = λu, where λ ∈ R+. Demanding
invariance of the measure yields π ∝ 1
u
du.
These transformations are not unique, and hence one could find many different
measures. Nevertheless, in the state of minimum information we don’t know what the
natural parametrisation is for the possibility space and different measures correspond
to different guesses. Surprisingly Jaynes’ principle is “relatively invariant” under sim-
ple parametrisation changes. For example, introducing a new parametrisation for a
positive quantity G by G = mn for positive m, or by G = exp(λ) for real λ, will give
the same measure.
There are two important points to note. Firstly the measure is derived from the
chosen set of parameters. Generally a different choice of parameters yields a differ-
ent minimum-information measure, predicting another maximum-entropy distribution
function. Let us consider the example of an ensemble of dust-FLRW models. The
different open and closed models are most conveniently parametrised by the constants
of motion, which are given by the cosmological constant Λ and χ ≡ aρ3γ , where ρ is
the energy density. This leads to the minimum-information measure (Kirchner and
Ellis 2003).
π ∝ dΛdχ√
χ
. (23)
Considering dust models (γ = 1) and the subset of all big-bang models which reach a
certain Hubble parameter H0 at a time t0 during their evolution this measure becomes
π ∝
√
Ωm0
|Ω0 − 1|3/2
∣∣∣∣ 1Ωm0 − 3/2Ω0 − 1
∣∣∣∣ dΩm0dΩΛ0,
with ΩΛ0 ≤ 1+Ωm0/2. On the other hand, as mentioned above, there is a convenient
parametrisation for this particular subset of models (Ehlers and Rindler 1989) in terms
of the observables Ωm0 and ΩΛ0 (in Ehlers and Rindler (1989) an additional radia-
tion component was also included). Using this parametrisation yields the minimum
information measure
π ∝ 1√
Ωm0
dΩm0dΩΛ0,
which is clearly different from the above result.
Secondly, the measure is in general non-normalisable and hence there is no nor-
malisable maximum-entropy distribution. Without additional information we are not
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able to calculate certain probabilities. Since it seems questionable whether there will
ever be additional information about the ensemble of universes available, one has to
accept that certain questions will have no well defined probabilities.
It should be mentioned that we encounter similar problems when we want to find a
probability measure for physical parameters like the gravitational constant G. Let us
assume that G can take any non-zero positive value. Jaynes’ principle then suggests the
probability measure πG ∝ dGG . On the other hand, if we decide to use 8 m = sinh(G)
as our parameter, then we find the different measure
π =
dm
m
=
cosh(G)
sinh(G)
dG.
4.5 Distribution Functions on MFLRW
Now, having properly parametrised MFLRW and defined a measure on it, we can
represent particular multiverses by giving distribution functions over the parameter-
space (as discussed in Section 3.4). Given a distribution function f it determines the
number of universes in a small parameter-interval by
dN = f(pI)π,
which is invariant under a change of parametrisation. Hence it is the combination of
measure and distribution function which is of importance.
While distribution functions can be parametrised by any set of coordinates over
the possibility space, we need different distribution functions for different possibility
spaces. For example, if universes in a multiverse must have a common value for the
gravitational constant G then distribution functions must not depend on G.
It is clear that a particular distribution function can be expressed in any set of
coordinates. Obviously there is a vast set of possible distribution functions. We want
to examine some particular examples.
Firstly, one could have a distribution function which is constant over the parameter-
space. The actual ensemble then really depends on the measure and is the maximum-
entropy distribution (which maximises (22)9). If we choose the observational quantities
H,Ωm,ΩΛ to represent the model and allow for different values of the gravitational
coupling constant G this would be
f(H,Ωm,ΩΛ, G) = const.
for all allowed values of the stated parameters. On the other hand, if we choose the
constants of motion as coordinates in possibility space
f(k, χ,Λ, G) = const.
The probability PA to find a universe in a certain parameter-region A is given by
PA =
∫
A f(k, χ,Λ, G)π.∫
f(k, χ,Λ, G)π.
,
where the integral in the denominator extends over the whole possibility space. For
many distribution functions, like for the above constant distribution function together
8However, it should be noted that any power (m = Gn,m ∈ +, n 6= 0) and logarithmic
relationship (m = ln(G), m ∈) leads to the same measure dµG.
9In (22) P (x)dx corresponds to f(pI)pi.
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with (23), this expression is not well defined. Let us assume that the measure is non-
integrable, i.e., non-normalisable, and that we have a constant distribution function. If
the set A does not include any point of non-integrability of the measure then PA = 0,
if it includes all points of non-integrability then PA = 1, but if it includes only some
of the non-integrabilities then PA is not well defined.
Of course, the above expression might be integrable for all sets A given a good
distribution function. For instance the distribution function
f(k, χ,Λ) ∝ exp(−χ− Λ2)
together with the measure (23) is integrable everywhere. On the other hand
f(k, χ,Λ) ∝ exp(−Λ
2)√
χ+ 1
diverges for χ → ∞. A distribution function can also introduce an additional diver-
gence, for instance
f(k, χ,Λ) ∝ exp(−Λ
2)√
χ
is non-integrable at χ = 0 and χ→∞.
A multiverse might contain a finite or infinite countable number of universes. In
these cases the distribution function contains Dirac δ -functions, e.g.,
f(k, χ,Λ) =


√
χ5δ2(χ− 3,Λ− .5) for k = 1
2δ(Λ− .7) for k = 0√
χ3δ2(χ− .1,Λ− 2) for k = −1
which represents a multiverse which contains 5 copies of closed FLRW models with
χ = 3 and Λ = .5, etc. The distribution function
f(k, χ,Λ) =
{ √
χ
∑∞
i=1 δ(χ− 1/i,Λ− 1) for k = 1
0 for k 6= 1
represents an ensemble with a countably infinite number of universes – all are closed
with Λ = 1 and one for each χ = 1/i. Similarly one could imagine an ensemble of 107
copies of our universe, which would be represented by the distribution function
f(k, χ,Λ) = 107
√
χδk0k δ(χ− χ0)δ(Λ− Λ0),
where k0, χ0,Λ0 represent the parameter values for our universe. This is very unlikely
in terms of a generating mechanism, but for ensembles without generating mechanisms
it is as likely as any other possibility. If a multiverse is “tested” by its prediction that
our universe is a likely member, then such an ensemble should be the most satisfying
one – but then we might just as well be happy with one copy, i.e., just our universe.
Similar distribution functions determine the distribution of physical parameters
like the gravitational constant G. For example with G ∈ R the minimum information
measure is dµG = dG and
f(G) = exp(−G2)
gives a Gaussian distribution around G = 0. If, on the other hand G ∈ (0,∞)
the measure is dG/G and f(g) = G exp(−G) would be an example of a distribution
function.
One can imagine various types of distributions, e. g., a Gaussian distribution in G
or in H0, or in the other parameters. But, in order to establish these in a non-arbitrary
way, we need a theory of how this particular ensemble is selected for from all the other
possible ones.
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4.6 The problem of infinities again
Even within the restricted set of FLRW models, one of the most profound issues is the
problem of realised infinities: if all that is possible in this restricted subset happens, we
have multiple infinities of realised universes in the ensemble. First, there are an infinite
number of possible spatial topologies in the negative curvature case, so an infinite
number of ways that universes which are locally equivalent can differ globally. Second,
even though the geometry is so simple, the uncountable continuum of numbers plays
a devastating role locally: is it really conceivable that FLRW universes actually occur
with all values independently of both the cosmological constant and the gravitational
constant, and also all values of the Hubble constant at the instant when the density
parameter takes the value 0.97? This gives 3 separate uncountably infinite aspects of
the ensemble of universes that is supposed to exist. The problem would be allayed if
spacetime is quantized at the Planck level, as suggested for example by loop quantum
gravity. In that case one can argue that all physical quantities also are quantized, and
the uncountable infinities of the real line get transmuted into finite numbers in any
finite interval – a much better situation. We believe that this is a physically reasonable
assumption to make, thus softening a major problem for many ensemble proposals. But
the intervals are still infinite for many parameters in the possibility space. Reducing
the uncountably infinite to countably infinite does not in the end resolve the problem
of infinities in these ensembles. It is still an extraordinarily extravagant proposal.
4.7 The anthropic subset
We can identify those FLRW universes in which the emergence and sustenance of
life is possible at a broad level10 – the necessary cosmological conditions have been
fulfilled allowing existence of galaxies, stars, and planets if the universe is perturbed,
so allowing a non-zero factor Π = Pgal ∗R ∗ fS ∗ fp ∗ne as discussed above. These are
indicated in the Figures above (anthropic universes are those intersecting the regions
labelled “life allowing”). The fraction of these that will actually be life-bearing depends
on the fulfilment of a large number of other conditions represented by the factor
F = fl ∗ fi, which will also vary across a generic ensemble, and the above assumes
this factor is non-zero..
5 On the origin of ensembles
Ensembles have been envisaged both as resulting from a single causal process, and as
simply consisting of discrete entities. We discuss these two cases in turn, and then
show that they are ultimately not distinguishable from each other.
5.1 Processes Naturally Producing Ensembles
Over the past 15 or 20 years, many researchers investigating the very early universe
have proposed processes at or near the Planck era which would generate a really
existing ensemble of expanding universe domains, one of which is our own observable
universe. In fact, their work has provided both the context and stimulus for our
discussions in this paper. Each of these processes essentially selects a really existing
10More accurately, perturbations of these models can allow life – the exact FLRW models
themselves cannot do so.
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ensemble through a generating process from a set of possible universes, and often
lead to proposals for a natural definition of a probability distribution on the space of
possible universes. Here we briefly describe some of these proposals, and comment on
how they fit within the framework we have been discussing.
Andrei Linde’s (1983, 1990) chaotic inflationary proposal (see also Linde (2003)
and references therein) is one of the best known scenarios of this type. The scalar
field (inflaton) in these scenarios drives inflation and leads to the generation of a large
number of causally disconnected regions of the Universe. This process is capable of
generating a really existing ensemble of expanding FLRW-like regions, one of which
may be our own observable universe region, situated in a much larger universe that
is inhomogeneous on the largest scales. No FLRW approximation is possible globally;
rather there are many FLRW-like sub-domains of a single fractal universe. These
domains can be very different from one another, and can be modelled locally by FLRW
cosmologies with different parameters.
Linde and others have applied a stochastic approach to inflation (Starobinsky
1986, Linde, et al. 1994, Vilenkin 1995, Garriga and Vilenkin 2001, Linde 2003),
through which probability distributions can be derived from inflaton potentials along
with the usual cosmological equations (the Friedmann equation and the Klein-Gordon
equation for the inflaton) and the slow-roll approximation for the inflationary era. A
detailed example of this approach, in which specific probability distributions are de-
rived from a Langevin-type equation describing the stochastic behaviour of the inflaton
over horizon-sized regions before inflation begins, is given in Linde and Mezhlumian
(2003) and in Linde et al. (1994). The probability distributions determined in this
way generally are functions of the inflaton potential.
This kind of scenario suggests how overarching physics, or a “law of laws”(represented
by the inflaton field and its potential), can lead to a really existing ensemble of many
very different FLRW-like regions of a larger Universe. However these proposals rely
on extrapolations of presently known physics to realms far beyond where its reliabil-
ity is assured. They also employ inflaton potentials which as yet have no connection
to the particle physics we know at lower energies. And these proposals are not di-
rectly observationally testable – we have no astronomical evidence the supposed other
FLRW-like regions exist. Thus they remain theoretically based proposals rather than
established fact. There additionally remains the difficult problem of infinities: eternal
inflation with its continual reproduction of different inflating domains of the Universe
is claimed to lead to an infinite number of universes of each particular type (Linde,
private communication). How can one deal with these infinities in terms of distribu-
tion functions and an adequate measure? As we have pointed out above, there is a
philosophical problem surrounding a realised infinite set of any kind.
Finally, from the point of view of the ensemble of all possible universes often
invoked in discussions of multiverses, all possible inflaton potentials should be con-
sidered, as well as all solutions to all those potentials. They should all exist in such
a multiverse, which will include chaotic inflationary models which are stationary as
well as those which are non-stationary. Many of these potentials may yield ensembles
which are uninteresting as far as the emergence of life is concerned, but some will be
bio-friendly. The price of this process for creating anthropically favourable universe
regions is the multiplication of realised infinities, most of which will be uncountable
(for example the parameters in any particular form of inflaton potential will take all
possible values in an interval of real numbers).
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5.2 Probability distributions for the cosmological constant
Weinberg (2000) and Garriga and Vilenkin (2001) derive a probability distribution
for the cosmological constant in the context of an ensemble of regions generated in
the same inflationary sequence via the action of a given inflaton potential where the
cosmological constant is given by the potential energy of a scalar-field. In multi-
domain universes, where spatial variations in a scalar-field cause different regions to
inflate at different rates, the cosmological constant should be distributed according
to some probability distribution P (ρΛ). During inflation the scalar field undergoes
randomisation by quantum fluctuations, such that later on its values in different regions
are distributed according to “the length” in field space (Garriga and Vilenkin 2002).
This leads to a probability distribution (or distribution function – the probability
distribution is just the normalised distribution function) of values of the vacuum-
energy density ρΛ in these regions given by
P (ρΛ)dρΛ ∝ dρΛ| V ′(φ) | ,
where V (φ) is the inflaton potential, and the prime signifies differentiation with respect
to the inflaton φ.
It has been suggested (Vilenkin 1995, Weinberg 1997) that the way the probability
distribution for existence of galaxies depends on the cosmological constant can be
approximated by
Pgal = N(ρΛ)P (ρΛ) (24)
where N(ρΛ) is the fraction of baryons that form galaxies. The requirement of struc-
ture formation as a pre-requisite for life places strong anthropic constraints on the
domains in which observers could exist; these constraints must be satisfied in the
really existing universe.
Let us first note that galaxy formation is only possible for a narrow range around
ρΛ = 0 (Weinberg 2000). It has been shown that anthropic restrictions demand
ρΛ . 10
−28 g
cm3
(Kallosh and Linde 2002, Garriga and Vilenkin 2002). Consequently
the anthropic selection factor N(ρΛ) is sharply peaked and vanishes for |ρΛ| > ρΛmax
for some ρΛmax, which is of the same order of magnitude as the observed cosmological
constant. In scalar-field models P (ρΛ) is in direct relation to the a priori distribution
of the scalar-field fluctuations and it has been argued (Weinberg 2000) that for a wide
class of potentials the variations of P (ρΛ) over the anthropically allowed range (where
N(ρΛ) 6= 0) should be negligible. Nevertheless, as has been shown in (Vilenkin-Garriga
2002) this is not always the case, in particular for power-law potentials V (φ) = φn
with n > 1 one finds an integrable divergence at ρΛ = 0.
It is clear that a similar relation to (24) should hold for multiverses in the wider
sense. Nevertheless, one could imagine multiverses containing universes with and with-
out scalar-field, or with different potentials. Hence we cannot link the distribution of
the cosmological constant to that of the scalar-field in a unique way, and there is a
vast choice for possible a priori probability distributions for the cosmological con-
stant. Let us assume that the cosmological constant is a remnant of some underlying
(unknown) theory and as such might be restricted to some domain of values. De-
pending on this domain one finds different possible minimum information measures,
which result from Jaynes’ principle. If the domain is given by all real numbers then
the (non-normalisable) measure will be constant. If on the other hand the domain is
given by all positive real numbers then the minimum-information measure gives an
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(non-normalisable) a priori probability distribution proportional to 1/ρΛ (Kirchner
and Ellis 2003). In this case the divergence is located inside the anthropically allowed
region and is non-integrable. For this case the expectation value vanishes, i.e.,
ρ¯Λ =
∫ ρΛmax
0
ρΛ
1
ρΛ
dΛ∫ ρΛmax
0
1
ρΛ
dΛ
= 0
and we fail to explain the observed non-zero value of the cosmological constant.
An interesting alternative is given by allowing the cosmological constant to take
values in the domain R+∪{0} (e.g., if the cosmological constant prediction is given by
a quadratic term). The minimum information-measure is then proportional to 1/
√
ρΛ.
Again there is a divergence in the anthropically allowed region, but this time it is
integrable. The expectation value becomes
ρ¯Λ =
∫ ρΛmax
0
ρΛ
1√
ρΛ
dΛ∫ ρΛmax
0
1√
ρΛ
dΛ
=
1
3
ρΛmax.
5.3 The existence of regularities
Consider now a genuine multiverse. Why should there be any regularity at all in the
properties of universes in such an ensemble, where the universes are completely discon-
nected from each other? If there are such regularities and specific resulting properties,
this suggests a mechanism creating that family of universes, and hence a causal link
to a higher domain which is the seat of processes leading to these regularities. This
in turn means that the individual universes making up the ensemble are not actually
independent of each other. They are, instead, products of a single process, as in the
case of chaotic inflation. A common generating mechanism is clearly a causal connec-
tion, even if not situated in a single connected spacetime – and some such mechanism
is needed if all the universes in an ensemble have the same class of properties, for
example being governed by the same physical laws or meta-laws.
The point then is that, as emphasized when we considered how one can describe
ensembles, any multiverse with regular properties that we can characterise systemati-
cally is necessarily of this kind. If it did not have regularities of properties across the
class of universes included in the ensemble, we could not even describe it, much less
calculate any properties or even characterise a distribution function.
Thus in the end the idea of a completely disconnected multiverse with regular
properties but without a common causal mechanism of some kind is not viable. There
must necessarily be some pre-realisation causal mechanism at work determining the
properties of the universes in the ensemble. What are claimed to be totally disjoint
universes must in some sense indeed be causally connected together, albeit in some pre-
physics or meta-physical domain that is causally effective in determining the common
properties of the multiverse.
Related to this is the issue that we have emphasized above, namely where does the
possibility space come from and where does the distribution function come from that
characterises realised models? As emphasized above, we have to assume that some
relevant meta-laws pre-exist. We now see that we need to explain also what particular
meta-laws pre-exist. If we are to examine ‘all that might be, exists’, then we need to
look at the ensemble of all such meta-laws and a distribution function on this set. We
seem to face an infinite regress as we follow this logic to its conclusion, and it is not
clear how to end it except by arbitrarily calling a stop to this process. But then we
have not looked at all conceivable possibilities.
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6 Testability and Existence
Finally, the issue of evidence and testing has already been briefly mentioned. This
is at the heart of whether an ensemble or multiverse proposal should be regarded as
physics or as metaphysics.
6.1 Evidence and existence
Given all the possibilities discussed here, which specific kind of ensemble is claimed
to exist? Given a specific such claim, how can one show that this is the particular
ensemble that exists rather than all the other possibilities?
There is no direct evidence of existence of the claimed other universe regions, nor
can there be any, for they lie beyond the visual horizon; most will even be beyond the
particle horizon, so there is no causal connection with them; and in the case of a true
multiverse, there is not even any possibility of any indirect causal connection of any
kind - the universes are then completely disjoint and nothing that happens in any one
of them is linked to what happens in any other one.
What weight does a claim of such existence carry, in this context when no direct
observational evidence can ever be available? The point is that there is not just an
issue of showing a multiverse exists - if this is a scientific proposition one needs to
be able to show which specific multiverse exists; but there is no observational way to
do this. Indeed if you can’t show which particular one exists, it is doubtful you have
shown any one exists. What does a claim for such existence mean in this context?
These issues are discussed in more depth in the accompanying philosophical paper,
where we consider the various ways one may claim entities exist even when there is no
direct or even indirect evidence for such existence. One ends up in deep philosophical
waters. That is unavoidable if one is to seriously argue the claim for existence of a
multiverse. Even the concept of what ‘existence’ might mean in this context needs
careful consideration.
6.2 Observations and Physics
The one way one might make a reasonable claim for existence of a multiverse would
be if one could show its existence was a more or less inevitable consequence of well-
established physical laws and processes. Indeed, this is essentially the claim that
is made in the case of chaotic inflation. However the problem is that the proposed
underlying physics has not been tested, and indeed may be untestable. There is no
evidence that the postulated physics is true in this universe, much less in some pre-
existing metaspace that might generate a multiverse. Thus belief in the validity of
the claimed physics that could lead to such consequences is just that, a belief - it is
based on unproved extrapolation of established physics to vastly beyond where it has
been tested. The issue is not just that the inflaton is not identified and its potential
untested by any observational means - it is also that, for example, we are assuming
quantum field theory remains valid far beyond the domain where it has been tested,
and we have faith in that extreme extrapolation despite all the unsolved problems at
the foundation of quantum theory, the divergences of quantum field theory, and the
failure of that theory to provide a satisfactory resolution of the cosmological constant
problem.
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6.3 Observations and probabilities
The ‘doomsday argument’ has led to a substantial literature on relating existence of
universe models to evidence, based on analysis of probabilities, often using a model
of choosing a ball randomly from an urn, and of associated selection effects (see e.g.
Bostrom 2002). However usually these models either in effect assume an ensemble
exists, or else are content to deal with potentially existing ensembles rather than
actually existing ones (see e.g. Olum 2002). That does not deal with the case at
hand. One would have to extend those arguments to trying to decide, on the basis
of a single ball drawn from the urn, as to whether there was one ball in the urn or
an infinite number. It is not clear to us that the statistical arguments used in those
papers leads to a useful conclusion in this singular case, which is the case of interest
for the argument in this paper.
In any case, in the end those papers all deal just with observational probabilities,
which are never conclusive. Indeed the whole reason for the anthropic literature is
precisely the fact that biophilic universes are clearly highly improbable within the set
of all possible universes (see e.g. the use of Anthropic arguments as regards the value of
Λ referred to in Section 5.2). We are working in a context where large improbabilities
are the order of the day. Indeed that is why multiverse concepts were introduced in the
first place - to try to introduce some form of scientific explanation into a context where
the probabilities of existence of specific universe models preferred by observation are
known to be very small.
6.4 Observations and disproof
Despite the gloomy prognosis given above, there are some specific cases where the
existence of a chaotic inflation (multi-domain) type scenario can be disproved. These
are when we live in a ‘small universe’ where we have already seen right round the
universe (Ellis and Schreiber 1986, Lachieze-Ray and Luminet 1995) for then the
universe closes up on itself in a single FLRW-like domain and so no further such
domains that are causally connected to us in a single connected spacetime can exist.
This ‘small universe’ situation is observationally testable, and indeed it has been
suggested that the CBR power spectrum might already be giving us evidence that this
is indeed so, because of its lack of power on the largest angular scales (Luminet et al,
2003). This proposal can be tested in the future by searching for identical circles in
the CMB sky. That would disprove the usual chaotic inflationary scenario, but not
a true multiverse proposal, for that cannot be shown to be false by any observation.
Neither can it be shown to be true.
7 Conclusion
The introduction of the multiverse or ensemble idea is a fundamental change in the
nature of cosmology, because it aims to challenge one of the most basic aspects of
standard cosmology, namely the uniqueness of the universe (see Ellis 1991, 1999 and
references therein). However previous discussions have not made clear what is required
in order to define a multiverse, although some specific physical calculations have been
given based on restricted low-dimensional multiverses. The aim of this paper is to
make clear what is needed in order to properly define a multiverse, and then examine
some of the consequences that flow from this.
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Our fundamental starting point is the recognition that there is an important dis-
tinction to be made between possible universes and realised universes, and our main
conclusion is that a really existing ensemble or multiverse is not a priori unique, nor
uniquely defined. It must somehow be selected for. We have pointed out a clear
distinction between an ensemble of possible universes M, and an ensemble of really
existing universes, which is envisioned as generated by the given primordial process
or action of an overarching cosmic principle. These effectively select a really existing
multiverse from the possibilities in M, and, as such, effectively define a distribution
function overM. Thus, there is a definite causal connection, or “law of laws ”, relating
all the universes in these multiverses. It is this really existing ensemble of universes,
not the ensemble of all possible universes, which provides the basis for anthropic ar-
guments. Anthropic universes lie in a small subset of M, whose characteristics we
understand to some extent. It is very likely that the simultaneous realisation of all
the conditions for life will pick out only a very small sector of the parameter space of
all possibilities: anthropic universes are fine-tuned.
The fine-tuning problem is very controversial. Two counter-attacks maintain that
there is no fine-tuning problem, so it is not necessary to construct solutions to it by
employing the multiverse idea. The first promotes the view that whatever happens will
always be unlikely (any hand of cards is as unlikely as any other). Thus, since it is just
an example of chance, there is nothing special about a universe that admits life. The
counter response is that the existence of life is quite unlike anything else in the physical
world – its coming into being is not just like choosing one out of numerous essentially
identical hands of cards. It is like being transformed into an entirely different higher
level game, and so does indeed require explanation. The second counter-attack argues
that inflation explains the current state of the universe, making its apparently unlikely
state probable. However, this move is only partially successful, since very anisotropic
or inhomogeneous models may never inflate. The counter response is that this does not
matter: however small the chances are, if it works just once then that is sufficient to
give a model close enough to the standard FLRW cosmological models to be friendly to
life. But this does not account for the rest of the coincidences enabling life, involving
particle masses and the values of the fundamental constants. Perhaps progress in
quantum cosmology will in the future lead to some unique theory of creation and
existence that will guide the discussion. At present, uniqueness eludes us.
Among those universes in which the necessary cosmic conditions for life have been
fulfilled is the subset of almost-FLRW universes which are possible models of our own
observable universe, given the precision of the observational data we have at present. It
is, however, abundantly clear that “really existing multiverses” which can be defined as
candidates for the one to which our universe belongs are not unique, and neither their
properties nor their existence is directly testable. The only way in which arguments for
the existence of one particular kind of multiverse would be scientifically acceptable is
if, for instance, there would emerge evidence (either direct or indirect) for the existence
of specific inflaton potential which would generate one particular kind of ensemble of
expanding universe domains.
Despite these problems, the idea of a multiverse is probably here to stay with us
- it is an important concept that needs exploration and elucidation. Does the idea
that ‘all that can exist, exists’ in the ensemble context provide an explanation for the
anthropic puzzles? Yes it does do so. The issue of fine tuning is the statement that
the biophilic set of universes is a very small subset of the set of possible universes;
but if all that can exist exists then there are universe models occupying this biophilic
subspace. However there are the following problems: (i) the issue of realised infinities
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discussed above, (ii) the problem of our inability to describe such ensembles because
we don’t know what all the possibilities are, so our solution is in terms of a category
we cannot fully describe, and (iii) the multiverse idea is not testable or provable in
the usual scientific sense; existence of the hypothesized ensemble remains a matter
of faith rather than proof. Furthermore in the end, it simply represents a regress
of causation. Ultimate questions remain: Why this multiverse with these properties
rather than others? What endows these with existence and with this particular type of
overall order? What are the ultimate boundaries of possibility – what makes something
possible, even though it may never be realised? In our view these questions - Issues 1
and 2 discussed in this paper - cannot be answered scientifically because of the lack of
any possibility of verification of any proposed underlying theory. They will of necessity
have to be argued in philosophical terms.
The concept of a multiverse raises many fascinating issues that have not yet been
adequately explored. The discussion given here on how they can be described will be
useful in furthering this endeavour.
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